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Politics typically revolves around personalities rather than
programs or proposals, and serve usually as means of
patronage (Quimpo, 2005). Patronage politics has always
been viewed as a negative practice and it has become a
defining characteristic of the Philippine political landscape.
Patronage includes clientelism, wherein politicians
prioritize their supporters in terms of governmental
assistances. The political elite solicits the support of the
relatively powerful who draw authority and strength from
the powerless voters for assistance. In return, these voters
are rewarded with the fruits of the influence and whatever
else that was agreed upon (Kawanaka, 2012). It is then a
form of inequality and it can be a network to political
dynasty, which is another prohibited practice. It has always
been seen as a rapport to corruption, red tape, and other
illegal practices such as nepotism or fixing (Chen & Will-
iams 2007). Patronage politics or personality politics also
involves the act of selecting or appointing persons to
certain positions disregarding qualifications of applicants or
appointees as it largely is preferential on the official. That
is, relationships, personal or familial, become the bases of
decision-making. Wilkin (2011) succinctly captured this
when he claimed that it is an indicator of bad governance.
Patronage thus hinders the efficient management of
political and economical resources of the state (UNDP:
Human Development Report, 2005). Hence, clientage is
often studied as disadvantageous in governance and demo-
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ABSTRACT
Patronage politics has become a defining charac-
teristic of the Philippine political landscape.
Clientelism, a form of patronage, is often studied as
disadvantageous in governance and democratic
consolidation. While the patron-client framework
remains the most influential among schools of
thought that explain Philippine politics, transforma-
tions in a clientelist exchange are evident given
changes in political, cultural and economic settings.
Using this frame of new clientelism, we look at and
revisit the structure of patronage in the provision of
housing welfare in the Philippines, focusing now on
the roles of three important actors— the nongov-
ernmental organization, the state through the local
government and the recipients or beneficiaries— in
an urban setting, thus deviating from the traditional
conception of patronage and clientelist politics. This
relationship of clientelist exchange is presented in
our Accomplice-Principal-Accessory (APA) model of
clientelism, with the local government unit of
Parañaque City as accomplice, the Gawad Kalinga
(GK) as the principal agent, and the recipients or
beneficiaries as accessories in the provision of hous-
ing welfare.
Keywords: housing welfare, local government, new
clientelism, nongovernmental organization, patron-
client relations patronage politics
INTRODUCTION
One of the weakest institutions of the
Philippines is its political system as it is
dominated by leading political families.
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cratic consolidation. As such, as scholars of Philip-
pine politics aver, there is an urgency to strengthen
the country’s political system to eliminate patron-
age (Magno, 1992; Rocamora, 2002; Teehankee,
2009; Quimpo, 2011; Rivera, 2011).
While it is true that scholarship on patron-client
ties dates back more than several decades, the
patron-client framework remains the most influen-
tial among schools of thought that explain Philip-
pine politics (Kerkvliet, 1995). However, transfor-
mations in a clientelist exchange are evident given
changes in political, cultural and economic settings
(Hopkin, 2001; Park, 2008; Reid, 2008; Tomsa and
Ufen, 2012) and it is under this purview that we
look at and revisit the structure of patronage in the
provision of housing welfare in the Philippines,
focusing now on the roles of three important
actors— the nongovernmental organization, the
state through the local government and the recipi-
ents or beneficiaries— in an urban setting, thus
deviating from the traditional conception of
patronage and clientelist politics. Aside from this,
we intend to contribute to the existing debate on
urban politics fulfilling what Johnston (1979) posed
as a challenge to urbanizing nations: how well
patron-client organizations govern their cities is
critical, as it will outline the urban future of much
of humanity.
The article is organized as follows. The first
section reviews briefly the extant literature and
theoretical considerations on patronage and
clientelism. The methods used in the study then
follows. The presentation of how the clientelist
exchange transpires in the housing welfare is next.
The final part concludes through a presentation of
our accomplice-principal-accessory (APA) model of
clientage.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Kaufman (1974), synthesizing the works of Lande
(1971), Scott (1972) and Powell (1974) pointed out
that patron-client relations are a special type of
dyadic exchange between actors of unequal power
and status and is based on the principle of reciproc-
ity. He further characterized the relationship as
particularistic and private and are anchored only
loosely in public law or community norms
(Kaufman, 1974). The presence of this clientelist
exchange between actors (patrons, brokers and
clients) organized into pyramidal networks is in
general agreement with more recent work on the
extant literature on patronage. Auyero, Lapegna
and Poma (2009), for example, looked at clientelism
as the distribution or promise of resources by
political officeholders or political candidates in
exchange for political support. Specifically, and
consistent with this, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007)
emphasized that political clientelism is a form of
transaction that involves the direct exchange of a
citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or
continuing access to employment, goods and ser-
vices. This relationship, Park (2008) argued, devel-
ops neither by force nor by contract. Thus, volun-
tary engagement characterizes these exchanges of
benefits. Clearly, as Trantidis (2013) put, clientelism
emerges from two interrelated political processes,
which are competition for office and competition
for access to resources distributed by political power.
The above definitions of clientelism fall under
what is referred to as “old clientelism” or
“clientelism of the notables” which is characteristic
of traditional rural societies. In contrast, “new”
forms of clientelism involve that where an orga-
nized political party that uses state resources to win
the client’s vote takes up the role of the notable.
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Furthermore, this clientelism is a less unequal and
personalized and more openly materialistic than
that of the old (Hopkin, 2001). This change in
clientele networks may well be reflective of what
Park (2008) believed is a function of the changes of
social configuration reflecting political and socio-
economic development. Kitschelt (2000) argued in
his study of linkages between citizens and politi-
cians that clientelist and programmatic linkage
mechanisms must be considered as equivalents as
they have the capacity to organize and institutional-
ize relations of democratic accountability and
responsiveness. He further pointed out that
clientelist democracy has proved durable and has
entrenched itself for long periods in a variety of
polities. Similarly, Tomsa and Ufen (2012) con-
tended that in Southeast Asia, in the Philippines
particularly, clientelism is resilient and highly
adaptable to a range of political, economic and
cultural settings and instead of disappearing, it has
transformed into a more complex pattern of
exchange. Apart from this, it is critical to empha-
size that Reid’s (2008) statement, that the civil
society, specifically nongovernmental organizations,
is by itself a sphere where clientelism and
semiclientelism predominate given that well-
intentioned NGO personnel who previously had a
critical stance towards clientelism would later on
ultimately become absorbed by these relationships,
is also an important evidence of the transforma-
tion in clientelist politics. As he argued, as more
overt forms of co-optation and authoritarianism
are reduced, more subtle methods of
neoclientelism emerge.
Given these changes, how then do we character-
ize clientelism that exists among non-governmental
organizations, the state through the local govern-
ment, and the voting public? What type of relations
are produced and eventually recur in these arrange-
ments? How, if at all, does a non-governmental
organization encourage patronage? How does the
state through the local government participate in
this kind of exchange?  These questions are left
unresolved in the study of clientelism and these
guide us in understanding “new” clientelism in
housing welfare in a highly urbanized Philippine
city.
CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
Clientelism is seen as a bond of reliance and
control based on power differences and inequality.
The connection involves two services- instrumental
(e.g. economical and political) and sociational or
expressive (e.g. loyalty and solidarity). The former is
provided by the top (patron) through a broker
while the latter is directly given by the bottom
(client/s) (Auyero, Lapegna & Page Roma, 2009).
Caprara, et al (2006) provided this in their study
arguing that voters tend to decide based on per-
sonal preferences. According to them, modern
politics had become more personalized, and politi-
cal choice was affected by two aspects of personality-
traits and personal values. The reason behind these
changes was the declining distinctiveness, diversity
and extremity in the parties. Most of the platforms
or goals presented by the parties were similar, so
voters end up voting candidates or parties with
favorable attitude towards them as voters. This was
somehow a form of subjectivity or bias because
instead of voting for the skilled one, you opt for
the closest one to you. It was a mild form of nepo-
tism or favoritism. The study concluded the su-
premacy of values over traits. For people, particu-
larly voters, it was more important for leaders to
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have broad goals to which people attribute as
general guiding principles. People put much impor-
tance on integrity. Adding to that, people wanted a
leader that they can trust, so this led to the practice
of political patronage or patronage politics. People
chose according to friendship, family ties or favorit-
ism.
The link between governance, clientelism and
democracy has been prominent in the extant
literature. For instance, Chen and Williams (2007)
examined the connection between political support
and red tape. According to them, red tape con-
noted wasteful and inefficient processes, excessive
bureaucracy, and inflexible organizational struc-
tures and professional practices. The study showed
that political support in terms of trust, confidence
and provision of administrative autonomy pro-
vided conditions conducive to development and
maintenance of developmental culture that pro-
motes learning, adaptation and innovation (Bo-
zeman and Kingsley, 1998). Hence, political sup-
port diminished red tape. However, political
support should not be too excessive to the point
that it would become political patronage because
that could lead to another conflict- corruption in
form of nepotism and favoritism.  Similarly, in the
study of Bangladesh’s transition to democracy,
Kochanek (2000) argued that a combination of
weak structures, patrimonial politics, personalized
political parties, patron-client relationships and the
absence of political consensus have resulted in a
partial democracy characterized by pervasive
corruption, absence of transparency and lack of
public accountability. In South India, Markussen
(2010) posited that while political parties can be
vehicles for economic and social development, they
can also serve as rent seeking instruments. He
continued that the allocation of public resources
according to criteria of political affiliation does
not correspond well with traditional standards of
democracy and good governance. As in Asia, this
link is also evident in Eastern Europe and Africa.
In Russia, for example, patronage may have been
re-orientated but they have not disappeared. As
Hosking (2000) identified, during the
privatization process, personal connections were
more important than ever. Present-day Russian
state and political economy are marked by ele-
ments of patronage and clientelism. Moreover, in
Uganda, reforms from the IMF and World Bank
were meant to curtail patronage opportunities
but the wide discretion given to the governing
elites in the implementation has led to the
contrary: donor reforms initiated under struc-
tural adjustment have not resulted to a smaller
state or in fewer public resources as initially set
(Mwenda and Tangri, 2005). Similarly, in Nige-
ria, the clientelistic chain serves as the channel
through which development projects are imple-
mented and thus rural underdevelopment
persists in spite of a continual flow of develop-
ment work, services and goods (Omobowale and
Olutayo, 2010). In Latin America, it is argued
that inequality is built into the patron-client
relationship and it is key to understanding social
and political relationships as in clientship and
citizenship and thus the crisis of democracy
(Taylor, 2004). This is arguably the case as well of
Argentina where symptoms of a heavily
clientelistic political culture is present given that
low-income Argentines are in danger of being
turned into political clients (Brusco, Nazareno
and Stokes, 2004) instead of active citizens.
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PATRONAGE AND PHILIPPINE POLITICS
The Philippines is also a paradigmatic case of
clientelist politics. Scholars who emphasize on the
clientelist nature of Philippine politics, specifically
of elections and parties, aver that the culture of
patronage has sustained the strong hold of patrons
over clients over time; and this precluded parties
from differentiating themselves around political
platforms. Teehankee (2009), for example, noted
that as personality-based organizations largely
organized around dominant local political clans
and warlords, these parties are anchored on
clientelistic relations leaving them devoid of
platform and ideology. Magno (1992) also claimed
that the political parties that developed in the
Philippines were mere institutional exemplifica-
tions of the patron’s vast networks of clients and
their alliances at all levels of governance. This
could perhaps be what Rivera (2011) pictured as
the scenario where “[congressional representatives
and provincial governorships] positions serve as the
nexus between national and local power by facilitat-
ing patronage flows and rent-seeking activities”.
On a similar note, Rocamora (2002) pointed out
that these elites’ interests were institutionalized in
political parties and enabled the clan- and faction-
based party system to remain impermeable of class
based politics.
Scholars have described how these ties work in
the Philippines and other paradigmatic cases.
Consistent with the definition of Kaufmann
(1974), Sidel (1997) noted that patron-client ties are
highly personalized, multifunctional, and affect-
laden.  He further opined that social relations and
electoral politics in the Philippines are character-
ized by the centrality of patron-client relations.
However, he pointed out the presence of force,
specifically violence, which is the reverse of recipro-
cal relations assumed by the patron-client frame-
work, thus offering bossism and warlordism as
state-centered explanations of Philippine politics.
On a similar note, Quimpo (2005) emphasized
that the patron-client framework is a prominent
interpretation of Philippine politics. However,
offering an alternative interpretation of Philippine
politics though his contested democracy that
combines the frameworks of elite democracy and
democracy from below, he argued that the Philip-
pine political landscape is characterized by a contes-
tation between a patrimonial elite who has a
minimalist view of democracy and subordinate
classes and communities that cry for a more partici-
patory and egalitarian democracy.
Lande (2002) observed that while Philippine
politics has changed since the early post-war years,
in the rural areas, personalism and clientelism
remain an important element of the country’s
electoral politics. Moreover, Kasuya (2005) also
posited that it is a widely accepted notion in the
scholarship in Philippine politics that the political
landscape of the country is centered more on the
exchange of patronage and favors among politi-
cians, and between politicians and voters than on
partisan ties and/or the policy interests of voters.
The more recent body of literature on patron-
age stresses the possible functional aspects of a
patron-client exchange in the Philippines and the
changes that go with it. Tadem (1998) for instance
contended that patronage politics has been one of
the reasons for the failure of government-initiated
cooperatives in the country. Moreover, Gonzalez
(2007) reiterated the influence of patronage in the
Philippine political economy when he argued that
clientelism is at the origin of path-dependence in
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budget restructuring in the country. Supporting
these functions of clientelism, the World Bank
suggested to limit the scope of patronage in public
employment to reform the Philippine bureaucracy,
giving way to a merit-based recruitment system in
the civil service. Eaton (2003) also maintained this
when he claimed that over the course of the
decades, in the Philippines, elite-dominated parties
mastered the politics of clientelism and as such,
non-governmental organizations are constrained to
influence the substance of the policy process. In
electoral politics, Teehankee (2002) opined that
clientelism and nepotism have reinforced the elitist
nature of Philippine elections and democracy.
Hedman (2010) succinctly captured this when she
claimed that the possibilities and the promise of
further democratization in the Philippines have
continued to struggle against the familiar politics of
clientelism, among many other obstacles. By and
large, in the Philippines as in elsewhere, clientelism
entails patterns of service provision and resource
distribution that overprivilege some groups to the
exclusion of others (Reid, 2008).
RESEARCH METHODS
This research is a qualitative-descriptive one
aimed to show the relationship between patronage
politics in housing programs and the urban poor in
Parañaque City. Using in-depth interviews at cross-
sectional timeframes with 15 individuals consisting
of Gawad Kalinga (GK) block leaders, GK officials
and LGU officials who were selected through
purposive sampling technique, first-hand informa-
tion regarding the perspectives of these individuals
on patronage politics in housing were gathered.
Because of the nature of the research, the names
of the respondents were mindedly withheld.
Questions such as, “Honestly, do you have any
connection with the GK or probably, any politi-
cian?” to determine the existence of patronage and
“Do you think patronage politics is wrong?” to
verify the points of view of the recipients on
clientage were asked to the respondents. Upon
accumulating the data needed, after reading and
rereading of the interview transcripts, commonali-
ties and variations of the respondents’ answers
were initially identified. Through coding and open
coding, themes and categories were established,
from which discussion of answers to the research
questions on hand followed.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
The existence of the patronage politics in our
society is well established, yet illusive because often
it is seen as a detrimental factor in the political
system. Based on the interviews and on the very
essence of patron-client framework, all three
entities commit patronage and serve as patrons
and clients, depending on the circumstances.
However, even though all the bodies involved act
as patrons and clients at different situations, the
three themes that emerged the most are: the local
government of Parañaque is an accomplice, the
Gawad Kalinga is a principal agent, and the recipi-
ents are accessories of patronage politics.
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF PARAÑAQUE AS
AN ACCOMPLICE OF PATRONAGE POLITICS
An accomplice is the one that may assist or
encourage the principal agent with the intent to
have the act committed, the same as the chief
actor. An accomplice may or may not be present
when the act is actually committed. The local
government of Parañaque is only an accomplice of
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clientelism because it has the same intentions with
the principal agent (GK) and full awareness of the
plans or activities but has a minimal participation
in the process. It is not a consistent actor because it
only interferes when it wants. As one respondent
from the LGU has said, the mayor only makes
appearances during ribbon cuttings and the GK
villages’ events; hence, the people think GK is one
of his platforms. The LGU will not engage in the
association unless it is ascertained of benefits in
exchange for its services. This actuation by the
local government upholds the “new clientelism”
Leonard has included in his 2010 study of patron-
age. “New clientelism” is a form of clientage that
gives emphasis on reciprocity. Unlike the tradi-
tional clientelism wherein the patrons use their
influence solely to manipulate the clients, this
“new clientelism” suggests that patrons practice
patronage to gain something else for themselves,
not just political trust. This “new clientelism” also
states that patronage has a farther local and global
reach. It is more widespread. This is observed in
the multi-sectoral   quality of the link among LGU,
GK and the recipients.
A respondent stated:
-“Gawad Kalinga is a private sector, so our usual
involvement here in UMADO (now Urban Poor
Assistance Office/ UPAO) with them is only the
land or area through CMP or expropriation and the
list of the recipients. We also issue the required
permits like electrification permit.”
As seen in this response, there is an intertwin-
ing connection between the private sector and
public sector, further uplifting the “new
clientilism”. Moreover, we can observe here that
the LGU serves as patron to both GK and the
recipients. For the GK, the LGU behaves as its
patron when it approves the programs, issues the
necessary permits, provides the list of possible
recipients and supplies the land areas to be utilized.
It can acquire lands or lots for the projects in two
ways, CMP and expropriation. The Community
Mortgage Program (CMP) is a mortgage financing
program of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) which assists legally orga-
nized associations of underprivileged and homeless
citizens to purchase and develop a tract of land
under the concept of community ownership. The
primary objective of the program is to assist resi-
dents of blighted areas to own the lots they occupy,
or where they choose to relocate to and eventually
improve their neighborhood and homes to the
extent of their affordability. In this program, the
local government of Parañaque purchases the land
areas and later on, the recipients will pay for it
monthly. Meanwhile, the expropriation is appli-
cable when the government finds a private unused
land that can be utilized to build villages but the
owner does not want to sell the lot. The LGU will
then issue an ordinance that will require the owner
to sell it. Aside from that, the local government
can also sponsor concrete materials if it wishes to as
one LGU staff has mentioned. The LGU, through
its staffs, also helps in the planning of the founda-
tion of the villages.
A respondent said:
- “We do the planning. We organize the area and
ensure the community involvement of each indi-
vidual. We provide technical assistance. We do the
math of land allotment.”
This scenario is actually a contradiction to the
argument of Antonio Gramsci that the civil soci-
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ety, being private and apart from the government,
has the capacity to eliminate corruption in the
political arena. He gives importance on the role of
NGO’s in controlling corruption and says that if
NGO’s can be strengthened and its efforts at
monitoring the state encouraged, this would
contribute to the eventual elimination of corrup-
tion. But as shown in this event, the NGO’s
actually depend on the government. The whole
concept of being private is not applied in our
system nowadays.
On the other hand, the LGU acts as the patron
to the recipients when it prioritizes its supporters in
the provision of services, particularly by including
them in the recipients’ list even when they do not
qualify and giving some of these followers allow-
ances. One of the participants has even stated that
he has been shocked by the presence of unknown
faces in their community.
One respondent said:
“I get paid Php1,500 as my allowance. But that also
changes depending on whether I was able to do my
task appropriately.”
The respondent that has mentioned this is an
outright supporter of the mayor, so he is provided
with cash for his service. On the other hand,
another block leader has said that he has not
received any allowance though he is a legitimate
block leader because he is not a supporter of the
regime prior to the establishment of their village.
We can visualize here the patron-client relationship
vividly.
The LGU has also prioritized its supporters by
handing them fully awarded housings, while the
recipients who have less political connection are
under the use of proc only. They are given 25 years
to settle in the village and when that term expires,
they have to leave the village. This is an evidence
of Leonard’s (2010) argument that people who
have less or no political connections are the ones
who are less or not at all represented in the society;
hence, they receive fewer benefits than those with
political links.
One respondent said:
“Yes, we do own this house. It is awarded to us.”
One respondent mentioned:
“We will soon have the land and housing title after
we finish paying the government.”
One participant stated:
“We are not aware that we could pay the government
monthly, so we can own our houses. The GK or the
city hall did not tell us.”
These three responses are from three partici-
pants who are from different villages. The first 2
respondents are from Marcelo and Salas, villages
with political affiliation to the mayor. The last
respondent lives in Aya’s, a GK village presumed to
be private. As shown here, patronage really does
play an important role in the provision govern-
mental assistance and the LGU of Parañaque
adheres to that. It is highly responsive to its clients
and passive to the rest.
Since a patron-client relationship is a mutual
one, the LGU- aside from providing- also gains in
its association with Gawad Kalinga and the recipi-
ents. Upon approving the Gawad Kalinga agendas,
the local government’s duties are lessened. Accord-
ing to R.A. 7279, the LGU has to uplift the condi-
tions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens
in urban areas and in resettlement areas by making
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available to them decent housing at affordable
cost, basic services, and employment opportunities.
Gawad Kalinga does it for the local government.
This is manifested in the following statements.
An LGU official said:
The local government gains in the relationship
because it is able to fulfill its obligation in accor-
dance with R.A. 7279.”
Another LGU officer-in-charge (OIC) stated:
“Of course, the projects of GK are in favor of the
local government because the MMDA has issued a
memo requiring us to relocate settlers in mission
areas and through GK, that’s easier to accomplish.”
Furthermore, the good image of Gawad Kalinga
as a free housing benefactor that promotes broth-
erly and sisterly love among the Filipinos is gradu-
ally reflected on the LGU. The recipients then,
unaware of the complete process, believe that it is
through the LGU that they are able to acquire the
housings; hence, they give their political trust to
the current regime before, during and after elec-
tions. Some answers that sustain this claim are:
One recipient said:
“They [LGU] pretend Gawad Kalinga is their project
and people see them as good because of that.”
A respondent said:
“We campaign for him and support him during
elections.”
Another one said:
“The ones living there are mayor’s supporters. They
even campaign for him during elections. They offer
other people money in exchange for votes.”
A local government staff stated:
“Bernabe used the Gawad Kalinga as a campaign
material to earn the patronage of the constituents. He
made it appear that Gawad Kalinga was initiative or
was his platform.”
ON “KALINGA POLITICS” AND THE GAWAD
KALINGA AS A PRINCIPAL AGENT OF PATRON-
AGE POLITICS
A principal is the chief actor or perpetrator of an
act, the one who plans everything. The Gawad
Kalinga is the principal agent in this relationship.
It is the one who has pioneered the establishment
of the links among multiple sectors, both private
and public. With GK’s template of land for the
landless, homes for the homeless and food for the
hungry, GK works hand in hand with local chief
executives to provide for the basic needs of the
constituents. Gawad Kalinga encourages the local
government units to be fathers and mothers to the
poor constituents and to bring services and devel-
opment to those who need it most through
“Kalinga Politics.” Moreover, GK encourages the
participation of private sectors through CSR. GK
sees CSR as a stimulus for economic growth and
nation-building.
As can be seen in the following replies and
specifically the local government officer’s response,
the Gawad Kalinga actually serves as a patron, even
without the LGU’s intervention. In fact, according
to some recipients and to some city hall employees,
there is a private GK village without the approval
of the LGU; hence, this shows that the GK is
rightfully the principal agent of clientilism.
A block leader stated:
“Gawad Kalinga convinces sponsors to support us
and they take care of matters regarding that.”
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Another respondent said:
“We have nothing to say against Gawad Kalinga.
They are the best to us! They help us a lot.”
A recipient mentioned:
“We feel secured here. We are not afraid anymore [of
diseases or dying]. We have doctors from St. Luke’s.”
A local government officer:
“We have nothing to do with that case [unqualified
recipients]. Those recipients have inside connections
with Gawad Kalinga.”
The GK operates as a patron to the recipients by
sufficing them with their basic needs for survival
and extending that help all throughout the exist-
ence of the community. It provides sponsors,
health services, conducive living environment, and
job opportunities to the people. Some of its spon-
sors are Shell, Philips, HSBC, Nestle and Unilever
from Europe and other American companies such
as Procter & Gamble, Colgate, Microsoft, IBM and
Convergys. The GK is always there for the people
and it even sets one GK official per village to
ensure the distribution of the goods and services
given by the sponsors. In addition to that, GK can
also include individuals in the recipients’ list when
they wish to. This is a clearer evidence of patron-
age because GK actually has no right to select the
recipients. Additionally, the GK serves as a patron
to the LGU by carrying out its task in accordance
with the HLURB as what has been discussed
above. Apart from that, one respondent has
uttered that it helps the local government save
revenues. Instead of spending the revenues to
relocate the urban poor, the LGU can spend the
money on other programs for the betterment of
the citizens and the city because the Gawad Kalinga
already does that housing and resettlement obliga-
tion.
Instantaneously, Gawad Kalinga is a client of the
naïve recipients and of the local government. The
Gawad Kalinga needs the people to entice local
and global sponsors to invest in their projects. As
one participant has stated:
“Without the people, GK is as good as dead. They
need the urban poor to attract sponsors. If they have
no one to help, no one will fund them. Let’s face it.
Most of the GK heads are businessmen. They are
profit-oriented.”
Another respondent said:
“I have heard of that issue. Gawad Kalinga has the
direct link to the sponsors, so when it distributes the
good and services, especially financial aids, to the
community, it has already taken some portions.”
This statement shows that the GK also gains
extra profit through the people, so it is a client of
the people. It achieves financial sustainability
because of the recipients. It has enough funds to
continue its projects because of the urban poor.
The Gawad Kalinga also requires the assistance
of the local government through “Kalinga Politics”
to operate. Without the approval of the local
government, particularly of the mayor, on the
“Kalinga Politics”, Gawad Kalinga should not
actually be able to perform its functions. There are
just some cases that slip through it. The local
government also provides the specific relocation
sites that the Gawad Kalinga can develop and the
initial file of recipients that the Gawad Kalinga can
work with. As one respondent from LGU men-
tioned:
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“Yes, Gawad Kalinga needs some permits from us
before they can operate anywhere here in
Parañaque.”
ON THE RECIPIENTS AS ACCESSORIES OF
PATRONAGE POLITICS
An accessory is one contributing to or aiding in
the commission of an action. It is a participant, as
by command, advice, instigation, or concealment;
either before or after the fact or commission. The
recipients are the accessories of clientilism because
they are the actors in the framework. But they do
not share the same intent as the principal and
accomplice. They are just left with no choice.
While the LGU and GK are the thinkers, the
recipients are the doers. They build the houses
through bayanihan, campaign for the LGU and,
innocently, inveigle the sponsors.
Of course, it is evident that the recipients are
the clients in this patron-client set-up. But under-
neath that, they are being exploited by the two
bodies (LGU and GK); hence, unconsciously, they
are participating as the patrons in clientilism. The
local government utilizes them to win electoral
posts or to maintain the positions they are occupy-
ing at the moment. Because of patronage, the
previous regime has managed to stay for three
consecutive terms. One of the respondents has
even said that he has nothing terrible to say about
the prior regime and he is depressed by the loss of
its descendant.
The Gawad Kalinga, on the other hand, uses
them to take profits from sponsors. One respon-
dent has claimed that GK has been taking its share
on the goods and services doled out by the spon-
sors. Moreover, another respondent has supported
this claim by saying that before the aids are distrib-
uted to the villagers, the assigned GK official and
the block leaders have readily acquired some for
themselves privately. This is supported by the reply
of one LGU officer:
“Of course, no one will sponsor GK without the
people.”
Since most of the recipients are naïve and most
of them do not know about the Gawad Kalinga’s
scheme, only few of them openly admitted that
they are knowledgeable of it and that there is really
an exploitation. A block leader has timidly con-
fessed that during meetings with the GK officials
for allocation of the sponsored services and good,
they take their share. But he claims that they take
only a minimal portion, just enough for them.
As clients, all the essentials of the recipients are
provided by the Gawad Kalinga and the local
government. They are sufficed economically,
socially and culturally by both entities. They do not
need to ask for anything. The two bodies (LGU
and GK) use their authority, social status and other
personal resource to give these recipients assis-
tance. One respondent told me that their village
has international sponsors from Canada and
Singapore through the efforts of GK. This is
further obvious in the other answers of the recipi-
ents.
One participant said:
“We don’t need to ask anymore. They readily provide
for us.”
One recipient stated:
“We have doctors and dentists coming over here.
Sponsors bring us food. All that’s missing is a job for
our kids’ allowances and schooling.”
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Another one said:
“I sometimes have my allowance as the block leader. I
am first in the receiving of the benefits from the
sponsors. I get assistance for my wife’s medical
condition.”
Philippine politics revolves around interpersonal
relationships- especially familial and patron-client
ones- and factions composed of personal alliances
(Kerkvliet, 1995).  Nonetheless, patterns of
clientage are different from what they were forty
years ago. First, patronage relations today have a
worldwide reach, through international trade,
bilateral donor governments or international
NGOs. Second, the means that power political
clientage today are less monopolistic and less
adequate to the task of purchasing peasant political
loyalty. Thus the chains of patronage are less tight
than they were historically. Third, the greater
diversity of patrons operating today are much more
likely to create spaces in which interests can eventu-
ally be aggregated into autonomous associations
with independent political significance at the
national level. NGOs play an important role in
opening up this political space although at the
moment, they most often act like a new type of
patron (Leonard, 2010).
Parañaque City is not an exemption. As shown
in this study, clientelism is endemic in its system
and it involves both the public and private sector-
the LGU of Parañaque, Gawad Kalinga, and the
recipients. The reach of the networks is interna-
tionalized as well. There are participations from
Europe, Canada, Indonesia, Singapore and
America.
 We have also observed that the principle of
reciprocity rules in the framework; that is to say
that the benefits are “private” or “club” goods, not
public. They are directed to individuals or small
communities, not to the general interests of a class
of people.  For a concrete example, we have stud-
ied 3 Gawad Kalinga villages: Marcelo Green, Salas
and Aya’s. All three villages consist mostly of the
urban poor population but the first 2 villages are
fully awarded, while the last one, Aya’s, is provided
contractually to the settlers. The recipients have to
leave after 25 years without any question. What’s
the reason for this difference? The first two GK
communities are composed of several supporters of
the LGU (mayor), while Aya’s is not. This is the
application of “new clientelism” (Leonard, 2010).
The idea of “new clientage” suggests that NGO’s
are used by the government to induce patronage or
sometimes, the NGO’s serve as the patron without
intervention from external forces. This research
shows that the NGO’s exploit the government to
gain benefits for themselves like how the Gawad
Kalinga initiates partnerships with Local Chief
Executives to establish villages that would attract
local and foreign guarantors. NGO’s are actually
the principal agent of clientage, with the LGU as
an intervening factor and the recipients as clients.
The concept of “new clientage” also states that
the patronage chains are less tight now, because
there are various sectors that can provide resources
to the people. However, as shown in the study, the
clients are still clingy to their patrons, and they give
out their absolute trust to them. They are overly
dependent to their benefactors; hence, they will
not abandon the convenience and comfort of
patronage.
The figure below illustrates a more concrete
process of clientelism in the housing programs of
the government of Parañaque and Gawad Kalinga.
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     FIGURE 1. SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF PATRONAGE IN HOUSING
PROGRAM OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, PHILIPPINES
As observed, all units are intertwined with the
GK as the center and the pioneer of connections.
The LGU, by being a patron to GK when accepting
its project proposals and assisting in the foundation
of the villages, also becomes a patron to the recipi-
ents through the illegitimate inclusion of them in
the housing programs and the provision of allow-
ances for services to some of them. But the LGU
also exhibits the behavior of being a client of the
GK and the recipients in the relationship. The GK
serves as its patron by doing its task under the R.A.
7279 and reflecting on it the good image of the
NGO, so people (including the recipients) will have
political trust on it and it will achieve government
stability and bureaucratic competence. The benefi-
ciaries, on the other hand, behave as a patron to
the LGU by giving it their full support and cam-
paigning for the mayor before and during elections
through word of mouth and money-play. In addi-
tion to that, the recipients obviously play the role
of the clients in this political alliance. The LGU
and the GK suffice them with their basic needs for
survival and give them the opportunity to develop,
so they can be independent in the future. Lastly,
the GK, as the center of these links, also definitely
gains in the partnerships. It actually has established
the framework for the benefits it can obtain from
the partakers, so it participates as a client of the
LGU and the recipients. It needs the LGU’s
approval to operate and it requires the presence of
the recipients to entice municipal and interna-
tional benefactors. When it has benefactors, the
money keeps coming in and its continuity or
existence and sustenance are guaranteed. This is
the Accomplice-Principal-Accessory (APA) model of
patronage politics, wherein the LGU acts as the
accomplice, the GK as the principal agent and the
recipients as the accessories. The principal is the
chief actor and proponent, while the accomplice is
a supporter of the idea of which it may be directly
or indirectly involved and the accessory is the
working hand of the principal and accomplice that
does not necessarily share the same intent but
nonetheless benefits from this relationship.
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